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We are all bastards,
And the most venerable man which I
Did call my father, was I know not where
When I was stamp'd.
-WILLIAM

SHAKESPEARE, CYMBELwE,

act 2, sc. 5.

t This article is based on a speech delivered at the Centre For Socio-Legal Studies,
Wolfson College, Oxford University, Michaelmas Term Seminar Series, on December 9,
1999.
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College, Oxford University for making this presentation possible. I would also like to thank
John Marshall Law Professors Donald L. Beschle, Walter J. Kendall, John D. Gorby, Allen
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Tova Indritz, Peter Goldberger, Richard Zuckerman, Ted Laurence, and Phil Foster who
generously and exuberantly graced this article with their wit, wisdom, and friendship.
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I. Introduction
Legal presumptions substitute for facts that cannot be definitively
proved or disproved. Presumptions that once provided efficient and effective resolutions of complex social issues, over time, may become facile
substitutes for the truth. How should the law respond when advances in
scientific knowledge establish that what was presumed to be true is scientifically false?
A contemporary example of this dilemma arises in the paternity context. In the absence of scientific proof to the contrary, courts dating back
to the Middle Ages have employed presumptions to limit or bar the introduction of evidence to ascribe paternity. Current developments in genetic
testing, however, can prove or disprove paternity and, thereby, call into
question the validity of such presumptions. Consequently, courts must decide whether to preserve presumptions of paternity and legitimacy that protect children from bastardy or to yield to scientific advances that, over
time, may leave us with more questions than answers.
The presumption of legitimacy holds that a child born during a marriage is the legal issue of both spouses.' This presumption was a fundamental principle of English common law that could be rebutted only by
proof of the husband's impotence, sterility, or non-access to the wife.2 According to Blackstone, non-access could be proven only "if the husband be
out of the Kingdom of England or beyond the four seas for above nine
months." 3 Additionally, Lord Mansfield's exclusionary rule of 1777 held
that under the law of England, "the declarations of a father or mother,
[could] not be admitted to bastardize the issue born after marriage." 4
The social benefits served by this presumption were manifold. First
and foremost, the presumption protected the legitimacy of children, which
in turn entitled them to the financial support, inheritance rights, and filiation obligations of their parents.' It prevented children from becoming
wards of the state so that neither king, nor church, or taxpayer was forced
to provide for them. 6 It prevented a third-party putative father from insinuating himself onto an intact family by claiming to have sired one of the
1. In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (N.Y. 1930).
2. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (citing H.

NICHOLAS, ADUL-

TURINE BASTARDY 1, 9-10 (1836)).
3. 1 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TH= LAWS OF ENGLAND 456 (1826).

4. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777).
5. 491 U.S at 125. See also Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood,Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. GeraldD., 65 TuL. L. Rnv. 585, 588-89 (1991) (discussing the loss of right of support and inheritance from fathers if children were illegitimate).
6. 491 U.S. at 125. See also JENNY TEIcHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF
BASTARDY

54 (1982).
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family's children.7 It helped to maintain the stability of the family at a
time when divorce was rare and spouses stayed married notwithstanding
other social relationships. The presumption also served the judicial system
by allowing courts to cut off debates between irate parents about the biological origins of their children at a time when doubts about a child's genetic origins were more a matter of suspicion than science.8
The presumption of legitimacy, like other legal presumptions, provides a consistent and explicit rule of law that enables courts to operate
efficiently and private persons to order their private affairs with a clear
understanding of the legal consequences of such undertakings. When a
presumption is irrebuttable, no factual inquiry challenging the truth of the
presumed fact may be entertained by the court. When a presumption is
rebuttable, some factual debate as to the truth of the assumed fact is allowed. In the case of the presumption of legitimacy, the factual inquiry is
limited to a few exceptions that are difficult to prove. Failure to provide
such proof means that the presumption stands.
Presumptions, as legal reality principles, have their costs. For example, one thing that most people know for certain is that no one can know
anything for certain. At best, one can make reasoned guesses, some of
which may be right and some of which may be wrong. Presumptions,
however, defy the truth of the proposition that nothing can be known for
certain, for even if there is an abundance of evidence to dispute the presumed fact, the presumption bars the court from hearing such evidence.
Presumptions, then, are legal constructs that serve values other than determining the truth of a particular matter. When a presumption is legally
recognized, there is always something other than truth-seeking taking
place. Instead, presumptions find their justification in the protection of
7. 491 U.S. at 121-30 (finding that the statutory presumption of legitimacy estopped
putative father from challenging husband's paternity because under statute only mother or
husband could rebut presumption; although the Court was unable to agree on an opinion,
five justices agreed that the statute did not infringe the due process rights of the putative
father). See also Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127 A.D.2d 6, 14-15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that the presumption of legitimacy estopped putative father from challenging husband's
paternity because parent-child relationship existed between husband and child and because
disproving husband's paternity would not be in child's best interest); Brinkley v. King, 701
A.2d 176, 179 (Pa. 1997) (holding that the presumption of legitimacy is irrebuttable as
against a third party's assertions of paternity when the child is born of an intact marriage);
John M. v. Paula M., 571 A.2d 1380, 1388 (Pa. 1990) (holding that putative father cannot
invoke Uniform Act on Blood Tests to compel husband to undergo blood tests to disprove
his paternity).
8. Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 180 (Pa. 1997) (stating that the purpose of the
presumption of legitimacy is to prevent marriages from being destroyed by disputes over
the parentage of the children born to the marriage).
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social values that sustain order and regularity and that are deemed to be
more important than truth.
Sometimes legal presumptions maintain order and regularity to a degree that greatly taxes their utility as reality principles. The presumption of
legitimacy, for example, starts with a given fact-marriage-and ends with a
conclusion about a different fact-paternity of the issue of that marriage.
Consequently, it is possible that in one case, a judge may both grant the
husband a divorce on the ground of the wife's adultery and also, relying on
the presumption that all children born during a marriage are the legitimate
issue of that marriage, order the same husband to pay support for the child
conceived as a result of the adultery.' To the public, this result is confusing, if not offensive, because the presumption requires acquiescence to a
conclusion that is false. Adherence to a presumption under these circumstances taxes our tolerance for legally fabricated truths and renders the law
an object of scorn and derision in the eyes of the public.
Until recently, American courts consistently have upheld the presumption of legitimacy. Now, however, courts increasingly are encountering credibility problems as they attempt-or avoid attempting-to reconcile
the presumption of legitimacy with current advances in forensic science.
Currently, genetic testing can establish to a 99.85% certainty that a particular man is not the father of a particular child. 1° It can also establish to a
99.99999% certainty that a particular man is the father of a particular
child." Today, DNA testing when combined with other genetic marking
tests' 2 can establish scientific facts that only could have been guessed at
ten years ago.
As a consequence, the conflict between scientific truth and legal truth
has become very disturbing. When a legal presumption is no longer consistent with the social values that previously justified its use, the presump9. See Richard B. v. Sandra B., 209 A.D.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding husband estopped to deny legitimacy of child born to the marriage but conceived of an adulterous affair despite his suit for divorce on grounds of adultery).
10. E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA PaternityTest: Legislating the Future Paternity
Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 29 nn.159-60 (1992-93) ("When combined with other genetic
marking tests, such as standard blood grouping tests and HLA tests, the Probability of Paternity can be raised to a Paternity Index of over a hundred million to one, or above 99.999999
percent."). See also Heather Faust, Challenging the Paternity of Children Born During
Wedlock: An Analysis of PennsylvaniaLaw Regarding the Effects of the Doctrinesof Legitimacy and Paternity by Estoppel on the Admissibility of Blood Test to Determine Paternity,

100

DICK.

L. REv. 963, 967 (1996).

11. See Shapiro et al., supra note 10, at 29. See also Faust, supra note 10, at 967.
12. See Shapiro et al., supra note 10, at 19-37 (explaining the variety of genetic marking tests, the scientific methods by which they are performed, and the precision of their
results); Faust, supra note 10, at 967 (explaining paternity indices and their methodologies
and predictive values).
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tion becomes simultaneously both true and false. The incongruity between
law and science invites conflict rather than constancy as the presumption
obscures rather than answers the questions it was created to resolve: What
is a father? Is fatherhood a biological question or a socio-legal construct?
Should courts uphold legal constructs that conflict with scientific facts that
may be highly disruptive of our social order? American courts have responded to the scientific assault on the presumption of legitimacy with
three very different models of reality. The three views represented by
these models are either extreme and unforgiving or highly discretionary
and subjective.
II.

The Pennsylvania Model
The oldest model upholds the presumption of legitimacy subject to the

common law defenses of sterility, impotence, or non-access. 13 However,
even if the husband successfully can rebut the presumption on one of these

grounds, the court may still exclude DNA evidence of non-paternity under
the doctrine of paternity by estoppel. 4
Paternity by estoppel is derived from the doctrine of equitable estop-

pel. Equitable estoppel bars a person who made a misrepresentation from
denying the truth of that statement if doing so would harm another person
who relied on the representation to his detriment. 5 Typically, the person
who is penalized by the imposition of equitable estoppel is the party who
made the misrepresentation-not the party who relied on the
misrepresentation.
13. See

BLACKSTONE,

supra note 3;

JAMES SCHOULER,

A TREATISE

ON THE LAW OF

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GuARDAN
AND WARD, INFANCY, SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 305 (3rd ed. 1882).

14. Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 532-33 (Pa. 1995).
Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal determination that because of a
person's conduct.., that person, regardless of his true biological status, will not
be permitted to deny parentage, nor will the child's mother who has participated
in this conduct be permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the third
party is the true father... the doctrine ... is aimed at "achieving fairness as
between the parents by holding them, both mother and father, to their prior conduct regarding the paternity of the child."
(footnote and citation omitted). See also John M. v. Paula M., 571 A.2d 1380, 1386 (Pa.
1990) (stating that once the party asserting paternity by estoppel satisfies the burden of
proving that the child was born during the course of the marriage, the blood tests become
irrelevant because paternity is automatically established by the estoppel).
15. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 632 (4th ed. 1972) defines equitable estoppel as follows: 'The species of estoppel which equity puts upon a person who has made a false
representation or concealment of material facts, with knowledge of the facts, to a party
ignorant of the truth of the matter, with the intention that the other party should act upon it,
and with the result that such party is actually induced to act upon it, to his damage."
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Paternity by estoppel is both similar to and different from equitable
estoppel. Like equitable estoppel, paternity by estoppel bars a married man
from denying the legitimacy of a child born to his marriage if he represented to the child or to the world that he was the child's father;16 if he
developed an emotional relationship with the child i" or provided financial
support for the child;'" or if he prevented the child from developing a rela-

tionship with his or her true biological father. 19 Unlike equitable estoppel,
which penalizes the offending party, paternity by estoppel penalizes an innocent party-the husband-to avoid penalizing another innocent party-the
child. The husband has not knowingly or intentionally induced the child's
reliance on his misrepresentation of paternity because the husband, too, has
been induced to rely on the misrepresentation of paternity perpetrated by
his wife. However, paternity by estoppel prevents the husband from rebutting the presumption of legitimacy since once the husband is estopped to
deny his parentage, biological evidence of non-paternity becomes irrelevant. The wife, in turn, is barred from testifying that she fraudulently induced one man to assume the parenting obligations of another man,
because under paternity by estoppel, the wife's deceit is as irrelevant as the
husband's DNA.
This model is well represented in the case of Miscovich v. Miscovich,2 ° decided by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in 1997. In 1986,
Gerald and Elizabeth Miscovich married. The following year, Elizabeth
gave birth to a son. Four years later, Gerald and Elizabeth divorced. The
divorce decree included terms for payment of child support. Gerald did not
16. Mancinelli v. Mancinelli, 203 A.D.2d 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding husband
estopped to deny paternity of child born of his marriage because he developed relationship
with child notwithstanding his suspicion that he might not have been the child's father prior
to her birth). See also McCue v. McCue, 604 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding wife
estopped to deny paternity of husband who financially supported child born of the marriage); Gullan v. Fitzpatrick, 596 A.2d 851 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding mother estopped
to deny ex-boyfriend's paternity because she held out to the world that he was the father).
17. Zadori v. Zadori, 661 A.2d 370, 373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding father estopped
to deny paternity of child born to marriage and with whom he had established a child-parent
relationship).
18. Id.; Chrzanowski v. Chrzanowski, 472 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding husband estopped to deny paternity of child born of marriage notwithstanding stipulation of lack of sexual intercourse with wife, wife's admission that husband was not the
biological father, and blood test results establishing that husband had no genetic link to
child, because husband parented child for three years during which he financially supported
child). See also McCue v. McCue, 604 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
19. K.B. v. D.B. & another, 639 N.E.2d 725,730 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that the
application of estoppel may be based on a finding that there was once an opportunity to
pursue a relationship with the natural father that has now been lost (citing Miller v. Miller,
478 A.2d 351, 358-59 (N.J. 1984))).
20. 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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challenge his paternity of the child during that proceeding. 2 Two years
later, Gerald observed that although he and Elizabeth had blue eyes, the
child had brown eyes. 22 Doubting his paternity, Gerald had DNA tests
performed on himself and the child. The tests conclusively established that
Gerald had no genetic relationship to the boy. A few weeks later, Gerald
informed the child that he was not his father and discontinued all contact
with hi.23

Eventually, Elizabeth filed a support action against Gerald on behalf
of her son. The court applied the presumption of legitimacy and found that
Gerald had not rebutted it with proof of impotence, sterility, or non-access. 4 The court ruled that despite the facts of Elizabeth's deceit, the termination of the family as an intact social unit, and the demise of the fatherchild relationship, Gerald was estopped to deny his paternity of the child.2"
The estoppel not only barred Gerald from disputing his financial obligations to the child but also rendered irrelevant the DNA tests that disproved
his paternity. 26
Not surprisingly, Gerald felt that he had been a serial victim in the
perpetration of multiple frauds. First, he was betrayed by an adulterous
wife, who then duped him into assuming the parenting obligations of another man. Next, Gerald was ordered to pay child support by a court that
chose to uphold the obviously false assertion that he was the child's father.
One might pause to ask why Gerald was the villain in this scenario. Here
is the court's answer:
We recognize that there is something disgusting about a husband
who, moved by bitterness toward his wife, suddenly questions
the legitimacy of her child whom he had been accepting and recWhere the husband has accepted his
ognizing as his own ....
wife's child and held it out as his own over a period of time, he is
estopped from denying paternity.2 7
Under the estoppel model, the self-perceived role of the court is to
protect the social institutions of marriage and families, in general, even
when they no longer exist in fact; and children, in particular, who are not
only the innocent victims of their parents' indiscretions but also are least
capable of bearing the costs of their own upbringing. The biological facts,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Super.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 727 n.1.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id. at 729-33.
Id. at 732 (emphasis added) (quoting Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A. 2d 351, 355 (Pa.
Ct. 1962)).
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no matter how scientifically compelling, are irrelevant to this view of the
court as the conservator of social values. Instead, the children are treated
like marital obligations that, upon divorce, are distributed equitably between the spouses, regardless of which spouse incurred the obligation.
III.

The Massachusetts Model

Massachusetts has taken a wholly different approach to resolving the
"nature versus nurture" paternity question. Unlike Pennsylvania, where fatherhood is a socio-legal construct, in Massachusetts, fatherhood is strictly
a matter of biology.
In 1994, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts decided the case of K.B.
v. D.B. & another.2" K.B., the husband, and D.B., the wife, were married
in 1977.29 They had unprotected sexual relations until they separated in
1979.30 In late January of 1980, D.B. had a sexual relationship with another man. A few weeks later, at D.B.'s insistence, K.B. and D.B. met and
spent the night together. Three days later, D.B. told K.B. that she was
pregnant. Based on the three-day interval between relations and announcement of pregnancy, K.B. doubted that he had fathered the child.3"
Nonetheless, "by the end of the pregnancy," K.B. had decided "to
play the role of father to the child known as Sally."32 He attended Sally's
birth, appeared as the father on Sally's birth certificate, gave Sally his last
name, arranged for Sally's baptism, and selected her godfather. He purchased Christmas, birthday, and other presents for Sally. He addressed
cards to "My Dearest Daughter" and signed them "Love, Daddy." K.B.
signed Sally's school application and frequently took Sally to visit his relatives on weekends. Although the three never lived together as a family,
K.B. allowed D.B. and Sally to live in his apartment while he stayed elsewhere. K.B. also provided a small amount of financial support to supplement Sally's welfare payments.33
When the Department of Revenue filed a nonsupport action against
K.B., the court ordered blood tests that conclusively established that K.B.
was not Sally's father. 4 At that point, K.B. renounced his relationship
with Sally and sued her mother for divorce. 35 Sally was then six years old;
by the time the case finally was decided, Sally was fourteen.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

639 N.E.2d 725, 730 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 726 n.31.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id. at 726-27.
Id.
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As a threshold matter, the court ruled that the blood tests were admissible to establish K.B.'s paternity.3 6 Consequently, the court never addressed the efficacy of the presumption of legitimacy. In fact, the only
issue addressed by the court was the Department of Revenue's argument
that K.B. should be estopped to deny his paternal obligations to Sally because he had established a parent-child relationship with her.3 7 In rejecting
the estoppel argument, the court said, "A married man should have no duty
to support a child born to his wife during their marriage but fathered by
another man, any more than a wife should have a duty to support a child
fathered 38by her husband during their marriage but born of another
woman."
The court framed the question as involving two issues, one a matter of
law and one a matter of policy. The court stated that as a matter of law,
paternity by estoppel did not apply because Sally had suffered no legally
recognized detriment.3 9 The court reasoned that although K.B.'s representation to Sally that he was her father and Sally's acceptance of him as such
may have satisfied the representation and reliance elements of paternity by
estoppel, Sally, like most children in her situation, was benefited rather
than harmed by K.B.'s provision of financial support to her.4 ° The court
was unimpressed that when K.B. renounced his relationship with her, Sally
was six years old and, therefore, old enough to appreciate her relationship
with her father. 4 1 The court noted that prior cases had refused to apply
estoppel only when the child was too young to appreciate a meaningful
relationship with his or her father and, therefore, too young to suffer a
legally redressable injury.42 However, the court rejected those cases on the
ground that such age considerations "would make the exception the rule
and the 'rule' applicable only to one and two year olds."4 3 So finding, the
court ruled as inadmissible any evidence suggesting that loss of the paternal relationship could cause psychological harm to the child.' In sum, the
Massachusetts court completely rejected, as a matter of law, the proposi36. Id. at 728 n.4.
37. Id. at 730. See also C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990) (eliminating the
conclusive presumption of legitimacy).
38. K.B. v. D.B. & another, 639 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (citing Symonds v. Symonds, 432 N.E. 2d 700 (Mass. 1982)).
39. Id. at 728-29, 731.
40. Il at 728-29 ("[lIt is rarely found that the husband's past provision of financial
support has worsened the wife's and child's claim on other sources of support .
41. I& at 731.
42. Id. at 729 & n.6 (citing A.R. v. C.R., 583 N.E. 2d 840 (Mass. 1992) (expressing
doubt that children ages two and one "relied in any meaningful sense on any representation
of paternity that the husband may have made")).
43. Id at 731.
44. Id. at 731 n.12.
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tion that severance of a parent-child relationship upon which a child had
relied as a source of identification, love, and social and financial support
could satisfy the "detrimental reliance" requirement of paternity by
estoppel. 45
The court also found as a matter of policy that paternity by estoppel
was inconsistent with Massachusetts' interest in strengthening the family,
"the basic unit of civilized society."46 The court framed this issue as a
choice between two views of the state's role in "fostering the raising of
illegitimate children within the protective wing of the family unit."'47 According to the court, the policy that recognized estoppel chose in favor of
children because of their loss of paternity, legitimacy, and financial support.4 8 The policy that rejected estoppel chose in favor of husbands because they had "voluntarily" assumed "the role of the father to illegitimate
children born to their spouses."4 9 The court favored the latter policy because it "encouraged" husbands to assume fathering responsibilities of
their "step children," if only temporarily, unlike the former policy, which
"discouraged" husbands from assuming such obligations for fear "of becoming permanently financially obligated for child support."'50 The court
concluded not only by ruling in favor of K.B. but also by ordering the
Department of Revenue to reimburse him for all of his prior support
payments. 5 '
The Massachusetts approach appears harsh enough to be characterized
as announcing "the best interests of the husband" test. Initially, the result
appears to be inconsistent with the court's concern of upholding the sanctity of the family since it encourages rather than discourages husbands who
wish to disaffirm their paternal status. Upon examination, however, the
Massachusetts approach to resolving paternity disputes does have some redeeming social values.
First, it is interesting to note that the caption of the case is "K.B. v.
D.B. & another." "Another" is the Massachusetts Department of Revenue,
which drove this case into the courts in order to increase K.B.'s child support payments for Sally. In so doing, the Department also drove a wedge
between K.B. and Sally because it was that action that precipitated K.B.'s
decisions to renounce his relationship with Sally and divorce her mother.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 728.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.

50. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of A.J.N. & J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68 (,is. Ct. App.
1987)).
51.

Id. at 731.
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There is, of course, another "another" in this story: the biological father. Though never named, the opinion makes numerous references to the
court's concern that the financial costs of Sally's upbringing should be
borne by her biological father.5" Perhaps, by refusing to play ostrich and
ignore the reality of such man's existence, somewhere, the court was trying
to force the mother to identify the biological father so that the Department
of Revenue could proceed against him rather than against the man who just
happened to be the most conveniently available at the time of the child's
birth. Under this approach, the role of the court is to find the truth, even if
the truth hurts, because it is inconvenient or disruptive of the status quo.
The Massachusetts approach tolerates no sixteenth-century legal fiction
about the social conditions of the twenty-first-century family. Instead,
Massachusetts recognizes that the "family unit" has undergone such significant reformulations in contemporary American society that the only
"truths" to which such families should be subject in a court of law are
truths that conform to contemporary realities. Hence, biological facts are
not only relevant to the issue of paternity, they are dispositive.
The winners when biological facts are raised above legal fiction are
the court system, whose hands are not sullied by the frauds and follies of
the parties, and the former husband, who is not burdened with the financial
or social responsibilities of providing for another man's child. Another
winner, of course, is the biological father, whose entire role in this scenario
is to be unavailable for any purpose other than procreation. The losers are
the child, who is left without financial support, paternity, or legitimacy,
and the welfare department, which must now apply its bureaucratic muscle
against the mother's silence to ascertain the identity of the biological
father.
IV.

The New York Model

The third model for determining the "nature versus nurture" paternity
issue is represented by the New York approach. New York courts frame
the issue as an effort to reconcile the legal presumption of legitimacy with
the psychological presumption that it is in a child's best interest to know
the identity of his or her biological father.
Under New York law, the presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted
with DNA tests that conclusively exclude the former husband as the father

52. Id. at 727, 730 ("The obligation to support a child primarily rests with the natural
parents ... ").
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of the child.53 Conversely, New York courts also recognize paternity by
estoppel, which excludes scientific evidence of non-paternity. 4 However,
under New York law, neither the presumption, nor the DNA tests, or the
estoppel doctrine is regarded as absolute. Instead, each evidentiary value is
factored into a determination that is intended to meet the best interests of
the child. 5 Consequently, New York courts will admit or exclude DNA
tests and will apply or not apply the presumption of legitimacy or the estoppel doctrine based on whether such information will assist the court in
arriving at a resolution that serves the best interests of the child. 6 Hence,
if a substantial parent-child relationship has developed between the husband and the child and no biological father is available to tag with the costs
of the child's upbringing, the New York courts may find that it is not in the
child's best interests to admit DNA evidence that disproves the husband's
paternity.57 Similarly, even if the biological father is available, New York

courts may exclude DNA evidence that proves the biological father's paternity or that disproves the husband's paternity on the ground that forcing a
father-child relationship on the unwilling parties would be detrimental to
the child.5"
53. See Robert L.A. v. Sharon A.R., 185 A.D.2d 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Queal v,
Queal, 179 A.D.2d 1070 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding blood tests admissible to determine if former husband is child's biological father).
54. Richard B. v. Sandra B., 209 A.D.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
55. See Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127 A.D.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); In re Sandy M. v.
Timothy J., 138 Misc. 2d 338 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988); Vito L. v. Filomena L., 172 A.D.2d
648, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (stating the paramount concern of the court is the best
interests of the child).
56. 185 A.D.2d 977 (holding that blood tests are admissible to rebut presumption of
legitimacy only if in the best interests of the child). See also N.Y. FAM. CT. LAw §418
(McKinney 1998) (stating that blood tests may be excluded on the basis of res judicata,
estoppel, the presumption of legitimacy, or if such tests would not be in the best interests of
the child).
57. Vito L. v. Filomena L., 172 A.D.2d 648, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("[T]he effect
of the [paternity] tests would only confirm the presumption of legitimacy or rebut the presumption without establishing the identity of the natural father. No purpose would be
served by branding the child 'illegitimate' and depriving her of the only father she has ever
known."). See also Mancinelli v. Mancinelli, 203 A.D.2d 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding blood test inadmissible to rebut presumption of legitimacy by former husband because
he held himself out as the father to the child and to the world); Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127
A.D.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
58. See 127 A.D.2d 6 (holding biological father estopped from establishing paternity of
child born to intact marital family where both husband and wife objected to his establishing
a relationship with the child); In re Sandy M. v. Timothy J., 138 Misc. 2d 338 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1988) (holding that when both mother and biological father object, judicially imposed
parent-child relationship is not in the child's best interests; however, if the putative father is
available and there is neither a biological father nor a husband who has established a relaHeinOnline -- 10 Tex. J. Women & L. 80 2000-2001
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Has New York made the most appropriate Solomonic choice? Legal
positivists would disapprove of the best-interests model because it substitutes subjective, sentimental analysis for the certainties that inure from the
rule of law. Rather than placing a premium on the best interests of the
child, positivists would argue that the proper role of the courts is to state
clearly the legal rules as to conduct and consequences so that people can
knowingly conform their behavior to comply with such legal requirements.
A best-interest-of-the-child analysis leaves everyone in doubt until the
judge waves her magic wand in one direction or another.
On the other hand, the New York approach has created a triage of
priorities that places the best interests of the child above all other interests-husband, biological father, welfare system, judicial system-unlike
that of Massachusetts, which places a premium on the husband's interests,
or that of Pennsylvania, which places a premium on the judicial system's
interests. Under the New York approach, the best-interests analysis takes
the moral sting out of the court's fact-finding determination by untethering
the judiciary from moralistic reality principles that may not hold true in
contemporary society. Instead, the court acts as the arbiter of social values
for the sole purpose of protecting the child. It can recognize or reject the
presumption of legitimacy, the estoppel doctrine, or genetic evidence of
paternity in order to achieve the overriding goal of protecting the best interests of the child.
V.

Conclusion

Today, the science of genetics is challenging legal constructs that protect children from bastardy and families from state intrusion. What if tomorrow scientific advances reveal that first-trimester fetal life has high
cognitive capability or that race-specific genes inhibit or promote intellectual potential? Should the law uphold time honored legal "truths" that affirm our social order at the risk that we will cleave to the notion that the
earth is flat when it is really round? Or should the law yield to scientific
"truths" that disrupt our social order and leave us, perhaps, with yet more
illusions that we mistake for the truth?

tionship with the child, then evidence of putative father's non-paternity is admissible if in
child's best interests).
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